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GUARDING THE GATE To EXPERT TESTIMONY:
KUMHO TIRE Co. v. CARMICHAEL AND STATE V.
COUNCIL
I. INTRODUCTION
Testimony by expert witnesses has become a tremendously important part
of litigation. With constant changes in technology and scientific research, the
information required to determine the outcome of a case may go far beyond the
knowledge base found in the lay experience of any jury member. Therefore,
experts often have to explain the very basis for many claims.
The increased use of expert witnesses to explain complex topics to juries
results in the need for rules regulating which experts will be allowed to testify
on what subjects. Trial courts must have a useful scheme for determining when
an expert is able to provide a useful, reliable, and relevant opinion to the jury.
Recently, both the United States Supreme Court and the South Carolina
Supreme Court have issued opinions addressing such a scheme.
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,' the United States Supreme Court
decided the most recent in a series of cases interpreting Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and the use of expert testimony. Kumho involved expert
testimony regarding an accident allegedly caused by a defective tire.' The
Court held that the previously used factors regarding scientific testimony could
also be applied to experience-based testimony.
The South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted South Carolina Rule of
Evidence 702 in State v. Council,4 which involved the use of expert testimony
regarding mitochondrial DNA.5 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
admissibility of the testimony under its own list of factors, rather than simply
following the United States Supreme Court's analysis.6
This Note discusses Kumho and its most significant predecessors, Daubert
v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7 and General Electric Co. v. Joiner,8 and
their roles in clarifying the use of expert testimony. Further, this Note explores
South Carolina's interpretation of its rules on expert testimony, as well as
South Carolina's application of the United States Supreme Court rulings in its
1. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2. Id. at 142.
3. Id.
4. 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
5. Id. at 17, 515 S.E.2d at 516.
6. Id. at 21,515 S.E.2d at 519.
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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most recent case, State v. Council.9 Though the approach of both courts is
similar, the South Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that it will not
explicitly follow United States Supreme Court precedent like Kumho, but
would instead follow its own scheme.
II. THE FEDERAL SCHEME
A. Federal Rule 702 and Its Application
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.""' The rule has two requirements: (1) The expert's
knowledge must be helpful to the jury, and (2) the witness must be qualified.
The first requirement only demands that the information be helpful, not
that the subject matterbe beyond the existing knowledge ofajury. Louisell and
Mueller state that "specialized knowledge or skill may add precision or depth
to the ability of the trier of fact to reach conclusions about subjects which lie
well within common experience."" Commentators have interpreted this rule as
presuming the admissibility of expert testimony." The helpfulness standard of
Rule 702 "goes primarily to relevance."' 3 Expert testimony, like all evidence,
is also subject to the relevancy test of Rule 401."4 Federal Rule of Evidence
702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to the
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."'"
As to the requirements for the qualification of an expert, the rule only
provides that the witness must be qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education. ' 16 Thus, by putting virtually no limit on how one can
9. 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
10. FED. R. EVID. 702.
11. 3 DAvID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 382, at 640
(1979).
12. FAUSTF. ROSSI, EXPERTWrrNESSES 26-27 (1991) ("Judges may differ widely in their
assessment of whether a particular kind of expert testimony meets the helpfulness standard of
Rule 702, but the presumption favors admissibility."); see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEiNsTEIN's FEDERAL EviDENCE § 702.04[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1999) ("Because of the Federal Rules' emphasis on liberalizing the
admission of expert testimony, doubts about whether an expert's testimony will be useful should
generally be resolved in favor of admissibility unless strong factors such as time or surprise favor
exclusions.").
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. For discussion of Daubert, see infra Part II.B.1.
14. FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating relevant evidence "means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.
16. FED R. EVID. 702.
Vol. 51: 965
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qualify as an expert witness, Rule 702 allows a wide range of "qualified"
experts in a variety of areas. "Thus within the scope of the rule are not only
experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians, physicists, and
architects, but also the large group sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses, such
as bankers or landowners testifying to land values."' 7
B. The Setting Before Kurnho
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Daubertv. MerrellDowPharmaceuticals, Inc.,"8 was the first majorrling
by the United States Supreme Court on expert testimony after the adoption of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Prior to Daubert, many courts used the "general
acceptance" test of Frye v. United States,'9 which stated:
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs. 0
Daubert departed from Frye by describing the duty of the trial judge under the
Rules of Evidence as a "gatekeeping role"21 in which the "judge must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant,
but reliable."' As a result, the general acceptance standard of Frye became
only a factor that might be relevant under the approach adopted in Daubert.23
In Daubert, two children and their parents brought suit against Merrell
Dow, the manufacturer of the prescription drug Bendectin, for birth defects
allegedly causedby the drug.24 Merrell Dow presented an affidavit by an expert
witness stating that, after reviewing all the literature on Bendectin, he found no
evidence that Bendectin caused any risk of birth defects2 In response, Daubert
17. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
18. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Id. at 1014.
21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
22. Id. at 589.
23. See 4 WEmsTEIN &BERGER, supra note 12, § 702.05[1]. After briefly reviewing the
history of the Frye test, the Court held that Frye was superseded by enactment of Rule 702, and
that "general acceptance" is no longer a precondition on the admissibility of the evidence. A
Frye-type analysis still bears on the admissibility of the evidence, but only as one factor in the
admissibility equation. Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
25. Id.
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presented eight experts who concluded that Bendectin had been linked to birth
defects in animal studies.26 The district court, applying the general acceptance
test, granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after concluding that the
testimony of Daubert's witnesses was not "sufficiently established to have
general acceptance in the field to which it belongs" due to lack of publication
and peer review." The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.28
The United States Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, holding that
the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.29 The Court concluded that the trial judge must determine, pursuant
to Rule 401, whether the expert is going to testify regarding "(1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue."3 The Court indicated that courts must determine whether the expert
uses scientifically valid reasoning and whether that reasoning is applicable to
the facts of the case.3 The Court identified four factors to aid courts in
determining whether the testimony will actually help the trier of fact: (1)
whether the theory can and has been tested;32 (2) whether the theory has been
subject to peer review and publication;33 (3) the known or potential rate of
error;' and (4) the theory's general acceptance. 5 Thus, the general acceptance
theory was replaced by a flexible, multi-factor approach which judges must
apply to the facts of a particular case.
2. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
The Supreme Court clarified the standard of review of the trial judge's
gatekeeper role in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.6 The Court held that the
standard of review in decisions involving the admissibility of expert testimony
is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. 37 The Court stated
"that '[c]ases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court
whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not
reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous."'38
26. Id. at 583-84.
27. Id. at 583 (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
28. Id. at 584.
29. Id. at 587.
30. Id. at 592.
31. Id. at 593.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 594.
35. Id.
36. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
37. Id. at 139.
38. Id. at 142 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879)).
Vol. 51: 965
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In Joiner, the plaintiff brought suit against General Electric after he had
been diagnosed with small cell lung cancer.39 Although the plaintiff smoked
and had a history of lung cancer in his family, he alleged that the cancer was
caused by exposure to polychlorinatedbiphenyls (PCBs)4 which were present
in the fluid in the transformers with which he worked." The plaintiff's expert
witnesses testified that cancer can be caused by PCBs, as well as furans and
dioxins to which the plaintiff was also exposed.42 These experts testified that
it was likely that the exposure to PCB, furan, and dioxin caused the plaintiff's
cancer.43
The district court granted summary judgment to General Electric after
deciding to exclude the experts' testimony on the ground that it was not
sufficient to "rise above 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation."'" The
Eleventh Circuit reversed on the basis of the Federal Rules of Evidence
presumption favoring the admission of expert testimony.4 The court ofappeals
also suggested that it was the role of the jury, not the judge, to decide the
accuracy of the expert witnesses' testimony.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.47 The
Court stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence "leave in place the 'gatekeeper'
role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying
'abuse-of-discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish
between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings disallowing it."'48 The
Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the
studies the experts planned to use were highly dissimilar to the facts of the
case.49 Therefore, it was within the discretion of the district court to conclude
that no relevant connection existed between these studies and the opinions
offered."0
Joiner was a limited case because it did not add new factors to the
gatekeeper role of judges regarding the admissibility of expert witnesses, but
instead clarified the standard of review, not discussed inDaubert, by ruling that
abuse of discretion is the applicable standard under the Federal Rules of
Evidence."1
39. Id. at 139.
40. "PCB's are widely considered to be hazardous to human health." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 140.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting General Electric Company v. Joiner, 864 F.Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga.
1994)).
45. Id.
46. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 142.
49. Id. at 144-45.
50. Id. at 145.
51. Id. at.146.
2000
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C. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
FollowingDaubert the lower courts split regarding the possible flexibility
of Daubert and the application of Daubert to all experts. Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichaed2 addressed this split by stressing the open-ended, flexible nature
of the approach and making it applicable to all experts. 3
Kumho arose from a suit brought in federal court by Patrick Carmichael
against the tire maker and its distributor. 4 Carmichael alleged that while
driving his minivan a defect in one of the vehicle's tires55 caused a tire blow-
out that led to a severe accident, killing Carmichael's passenger and injuring
several others.5 In a deposition, Dennis Carlson, Jr. testified as an expert for
Carmichael regarding the tire failure. 7
Carlson's testimony assumed certain undisputed facts about tires in
general58 as well as the specific tire involved in the accident.59 For the purpose
of the appeal, the Supreme Court also accepted that these premises were not in
dispute.60 Ultimately, Carlson concluded that a manufacturing defect caused the
tire failure.'
52. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
53. Id. at 141; see also 4 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 12, § 702.05[2][b] ("In Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court answered the questions whether and to what extent
the Daubert approach to scientific evidence should be applied to technical and other expert
evidence."(footnote omitted)).
54. The Supreme Court collectively referred to the tire maker and distributor as "Kumho
Tire." Id.
55. Id.
56. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142.
57. Id.
58. The Court noted:
Carlson's depositions relied upon certain features of tire technology that
are not in dispute. A steel belted radial tire like the Carmichaels' is made
up of a "carcass" containing many layer of flexible cords, called "plies,"
along which (between the cords and the outer tread) are laid steel strips
called "belts."
Id.
59. Id. at 143. ("Carlson's testimony also accepted certain background facts about the tire
in question. He assumed that before the blowout the tire had traveled far .... He conceded that
the tire tread had at least two punctures which had been inadequately repaired.").
60. Id. at 144.
61. Id. at 143-44. Carlson relied on three premises:
First, a tire's carcass should stay bound to the inner side of the tread for a
significant period of time after its tread depth has worn away. Second, the
tread of the tire at issue had separated from its inner steel-belted carcass
prior to the accident. Third, this "separation" caused the blowout.
Id. (citations omitted).
Vol. 51: 965
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The defendants challenged several propositions which led to Carlson's
conclusion.6' Carlson indicated that if overdeflection63 does not cause
separation," then separation is likely caused by a tire defect.65 Further, if the
tire has suffered from overdeflection, it will show at least two of four physical
symptoms.66 After inspecting the tire and using these propositions, Carlson
determined that the tire did not have two or more of the symptoms needed to
indicate overdeflection.67 Accordingly, because (1) the tire did not have the
necessary indications of overdeflection and (2) no evidence indicated that
punctures caused the failure, Carlson testified that a defect in the tire must have
caused the failure.6"
The district court, concerned that the method Carlson used was
insufficiently reliable under Rule 702, concluded that the testimony was
inadmissable, and granted the defendants summary judgment.69 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's use of Daubert's reliability
factors was incorrect because Daubert was limited to scientific experts relying
on scientific principles and did not apply to experience-based testimony.7"
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari in light of uncertainty among the
lower courts about whether, or how, Daubert applies to expert testimony that
might be characterized as based not upon 'scientific' knowledge, but rather
upon 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge."7' The Court held that the
Daubert gatekeeper analysis should be applied broadly and should be applied
to all experts, whether using scientific or experienced-based knowledge. 72 The
Court further held that the Daubert gatekeeper analysis encompassed all
experts for three reasons.73 First, the language of Rule 702 makes no distinction
between scientific and experience-based testimony.74 Second, the rationale
underlying Daubert's analysis was itself not limited to one specific type of
knowledge. 75 Finally, the difficulty in determining where one crossed the line
62. Id.
63. Overdeflection "consists of underinflating the tire or causing it to carry too much
weight, thereby generating heat that can undo the chemical tread/carcass bond." Id. at 144.
64. Separation occurs when the tire's carcass does not stay bound to the inner side of the
tread. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The following symptoms indicated overdeflection: (1) tread wear on the tire's
shoulder greater than that in the center, (2) "signs of a bead groove," (3) sidewalls with tire
deterioration, and (4) "marks on the tire's rim flang." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 145.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 146.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 147. For a discussion of the Daubert analysis, see supra Part II.B.1.
73. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-48.
74. Id. at 147.
75. Id. at 148.
2000
7
Thorsvold: Guarding the Gate to Expert Testimony: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmicha
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
between scientific and experience-based knowledge would prove
insurmountable for judges.76
Kumho also made it clear that the factors used to determine whether an
expert's testimony is reliable should be determined on a case by case basis."
The Daubert factors are not an exhaustive checklist, nor are they always
applicable. In fulfilling its gatekeeper role, the trial court should select the
factors that provide a reasonable measure of reliability in the case involved.78
No single test for reliability exists:
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all
time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert,
nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by
category of expert orby kind of evidence. Too much depends
upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at
issue.79
Finally, the Court held that appellate courts should continue to use the
abuse of discretion standard set forth in Joiner when reviewing the trial court's
decision on expert testimony. The Court stated: "The trial court must have the
same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability.., as it
enjoys when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is reliable."8
The Court granted broad discretion to the trial courts in ascertaining whether
the Daubert factors are a reasonable measure of reliability in each case.8
Applying this approach to Carlson's testimony in Kumho, the Court found
the district court's decision reasonable, stating: "Those transcripts cast
considerable doubt upon the reliability of both the explicit theory (about the
need for two signs ofabuse) and the implicit proposition (about the significance
of visual inspection in this case)."82 Therefore, the trial court was within its
discretion in refusing to allow Carlson to testify.8" Specifically, the Court
pointed to the lack of proof indicating that other experts in the industry use
Carlson's test, as well as Carlson's failure to satisfy any factors, Daubert or
otherwise, that showed the reliability of his testimony." Some showing of
reliability was needed for the trial court to conclude that Carlson had sufficient
knowledge to assist the jurors in this case.85
76. Id.
77. Id. at 152.
78. Id. at 151.
79. Id. at 150.
80. Id. at 152.
81. Id. at 153.
82. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 154.
83. Id. at 155.
84. Id. at 156.
85. Id. at 158.
Vol. 51: 965
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D. The Kumho Impact
Although lower federal courts vary when applying Kumho to expert
witness cases, the courts have not had any trouble incorporating Kumho into
their already established Daubert analysis.86 For those courts who already
interpretedDaubert broadly and applied itto all experts, there is relatively little
change. For those who had construed Daubert strictly, it is merely a matter of
expanding their application. Further, all courts now have the opportunity to
create their own factors in determining admissibility.
In Westberry v. Gislaved GummiAB, 8 7 the Fourth Circuit considered expert
testimony for the first time after Kumho. In Westberry the plaintiff alleged
damages from exposure to talcum powder.8 The powder was used on rubber
gaskets manufactured by GGAB, the company for which Westberry worked. 9
Westberry claimed he was not warned of any danger and therefore did not wear
any type of protective clothing or gear." The expert witness in the case was
Westberry's treating physician who testified about Westberry's sinus
problem.91 The Fourth Circuit cited Kumho several times in its general
discussion regarding the admissibility of the expert's testimony, including
reference to the discretion left to the court to determine the relevant factors.92
The court found that: "[t]he [trial] court has broad latitude to consider
whatever factors bearing on validity that the court finds to be useful; the
particular factors will depend upon the unique circumstances of the expert
testimony involved."'93
The Fourth Circuit, basing its opinion on Kumho, opted not to use the list
of factors in Daubert when determining whether to allow the testimony.9 4
Instead, the court focused on the particular circumstances of the case to
determine that it would be more useful to consider factors95 other than those
mentioned in Daubert. Recognizing that Kumho gave the option of selecting
factors, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the doctor's
testimony based in part on the temporal relationship between exposure and the
86. See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum,
Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999).
87. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 260.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at261.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 263.
95. The court wrote: "We previously have upheld the admission of an expert opinion on
causation based upon a differential diagnosis." Id. The court noted that differential diagnosis
"has widespread acceptance in the medical community, has been subjectto peerreview, and does
not frequently lead to incorrect results." Id. at 262 (quoting Brown v. Southeastern Penn. Transp.
Auth., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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problems 96 rather than refusing to admit the testimony for lack of studies or
peer review.' The Fourth Circuit determined that in this case the temporal
relationship alone satisfied the reliability prong of Rule 702; therefore, it was
"a valid foundation for an expert opinion."'
The Fifth Circuit has also recently used Kumho. Both Curtis v. M&S
Petroleum, Inc.99 and Black v. Food Lion, Inc.'0 deal with the use of expert
witnesses. In Curtis, an industrial hygienist was going to testify as an expert
that the plaintiff's exposure to benzene caused the plaintiff's symptoms and
long-term health problems.'"' The trial court did not allow the testimony
because "it did not satisfy the requirements set forth in Daubert."'' 2
The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that the district court abused its
discretion in excluding the expert's testimony. 0 3 Reviewing the Daubert
factors,0 4 the court held that the testimony was admissible because the expert
showed several scientific studies as support and pointed to a strong temporal
connection between exposure and the onset of symptoms.) ° As in Westberry,
the court looked at the Daubert factors, as well as factors of its own, to
determine admissibility."s However, Kumho ultimately did not alter the
outcome of the case. 
0 7
The Fifth Circuit again applied Kumho in Black v. Food Lion, Inc."' In
Black, the plaintiffslipped on mayonnaise while shopping in Food Lion.0 9 The
plaintiff's expert witness diagnosed her with fibromyalgia syndrome and
hypothesized that it was caused by Black's fall at the store."10 Against Food
Lion's objections, the trial court allowed the expert to testify."'
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Kumho to hold that the Daubert factors can
be used in all appropriate cases and that the court should come up with its own
factors in those cases in which the Daubert factors are not appropriate."' The
Fifth Circuit stated: "In the vast majority of cases, the district court first should
96. The court focused on the fact that differential diagnosis is generally accepted in the
medical community, stating that differential diagnosis "is a standard scientific technique of
identifying the cause of a medical problem ..." Id. at 262.
97. Id. at 262.
98. Id. at263.
99. 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999).
100. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
101. Curtis, 174 F.3d at 668.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 672.
104. The court found that Kumho did not apply, stating "Kumho does not affect the result
here, because the instant case involves what is undeniably scientific evidence." Id. at 668 n. 5.
105. Id. at 670.
106. Id. at 668-69.
107. Id. at 668 n.5.
108. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
109. Id. at 309.
110. Id.
111. Id. at3lO.
112. Id. at311-12.
Vol. 51: 965
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decide whether the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate. Once it
considers the Daubert factors, the court then can consider whether other
factois, not mentioned in Daubert, are relevant to the case at hand."
' 3
Following this reasoning, the court held that the expert's testimony failed to
meet the Daubert factors and that the trial judge did not indicate any other
factors which would be more appropriate." 4 Thus, the magistrate judge abused
his discretion in admitting the expert's testimony."'
The broad discretion given trial judges when determining whether to admit
expert testimonyhas a two-edged effect. On the one hand, discretion may create
a wide range of results in similar cases. For example, one federal court judge
may allow testimony about a controversial new study while another will opt to
exclude such testimony. Ultimately, this could lead to a great deal of
uncertainty for litigators when selecting expert witnesses. On the other hand,
case by case analysis appears both practical and necessary because it would be
nearly impossible for the Supreme Court to create a test which would be
appropriate for all types of issues and for all types of expert testimony.
Most scholars question the unpredictability ofthe Kumho analysis. As one
commentator has noted: "The lack of an objective standard, combined with the
lack of a minimum standard for the scientific proficiency of litigators and
judges, defies a basic goal of the law, namely to make the outcome of a
Dauberthearing predictable."" 6 Thus, the concern is thatKumho creates more
confusion rather than less. William Latham writes: "More judicial discretion
means more uncertainty for litigants and more 'wiggle room' for use by zealous
advocates in arguing both for and against the admissibility of particular expert
testimony. In this regard, Kumho it seems, raises more questions than it
answers."17
Ill. SOUTH CAROLINA'S SCHEME
A. South Carolina Rule 702 and Application
South Carolina Rule of Evidence 702 is identical to the federal rule."8
However, although the language is identical to its federal counterpart, the South
113. Id.
114. Id. at312.
115. Id.
116. Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B. Meyer, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony
More Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 331 (1999); see also Kimberly M. Hrabosky, Kumho
Tire v. Carmichael: StretchingDaubertBeyondRecognition, 8 GEO. MAsoNL.REv. 203 (1999);
K. IssacdeVyver, OpeningtheDoorButKeeping the Lights Off. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
andtheApplicability ofthe Daubert Test to NonscientificEvidence, 50 CAsEW. REs. L. REv. 177
(1999).
117. William H. Latham, The "Gatekeepers' Discretion:" Flexible Standards on
Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Wake ofKumho, S.C. LAW., July-Aug. 1999 at 15, 19.
118. S.C. R. EvlD. 702. The former Rule 43(m)(1) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure was also identical.
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Carolina Supreme Court stated in State v. Council". that it did not follow
Daubert120 South Carolina instead continued to follow its own precedent and
to apply the South Carolina test for admissibility of expert testfinony
announced in State v. Jones2' and further clarified in State v. Ford.22 This
approach has enabled South Carolina to avoid some of the questions of
flexibility and applicability left unanswered by Daubert.
B. The South Carolina Cases
1. State v. Jones
State v. Jones involved the admission of "bite mark" evidence to identify
an attacker by comparing the bite marks on the victim's body with the dental
records of the accused." The dental record testimony was given by a
prosthodontist who had made dental impressions of the accused. 4 An
odontologist then testified as a "bite mark" expert and compared these records
with the bite marks."z
The South Carolina Supreme Court, noting that there was no showing that
the techniques used "were other than accepted by the photographic and dental
communities,"' 26 found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
allowing this testimony to go to thejury.2 According to the court, the decision
to allow expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.
2
1
Holding that admissibility depends upon "'the degree to which the trier of fact
must accept, on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in
court and not even generally accepted outside the courtroom," 9 the South
Carolina Supreme Court used a liberal standard of review and upheld the
decision to allow the testimony.
30
2. State v. Ford
The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of expert
testimony again in State v. Ford.13' In Ford, the defendant challenged the
testimony of a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analyst who testified that the
119. 335 S.C. 1,515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
120. Id. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
121. 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
122. 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990).
123. Jones, 273 S.C. at 731, 259 S.E.2d at 124.
124. Id. at 731-32, 259 S.E.2d at 124-25.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 732, 259 S.E.2d at 125.
127. Id. at 731, 259 S.E.2d at 125.
128. Id. at 731,259 S.E.2d at 124.
129. Id. (quoting People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).
130. Id. at 732, 259 S.E.2d at 125.
131. 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990).
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DNA extracted from sperm found in a rape victim's underwear matched that
of the defendant Ford.32 Ford was an African-American on trial for rape and
kidnapping. DNA from sperm in the victim's underwear and in a vaginal
swab taken from the victim matched the DNA found in Ford's blood sample."3
The trial court admitted testimony of this match and testimony that this type of
DNA match would only be found in one out of twenty-three million North
American blacks.'35
The South Carolina Supreme Court looked at several factors in deciding
if this evidence was admissible under Jones, including (1) the publications and
peer review of the technique; (2) prior application of the method to the type of
evidence involved in the case; (3) the quality control procedures used to ensure
reliability; and (4) the consistency of the method with recognized scientific
laws and procedures.'36 The court concluded that the numerous articles
documenting the DNA print test, the fact that other courts had allowed the test,
that the tests were conducted in an established manner, and that even Ford
conceded that the DNA tests had received general acceptance, rendered the
testimony admissible.'37 Accordingly, the court held that the lower court had
not abused its discretion when finding that the DNA evidence was
admissible.
38
3. State v. Council
In State v. Council,'39 the prosecution's expert testified that the results of
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing performed on hairs found at the scene of
an assault and murder implicated the defendant."4 The expert described the
complicated concept of mtDNA analysis to the jury and then explained that,
though he had found a match ofmtDNA between unrelated Caucasians, he had
never found a match between unrelated African- Americans.' 4 1 Based on this
analysis the expert stated "that most probably the hair that was recovered from
the crime scene belonged to appellant."' 42 The trial judge found this evidence
admissible under the approach to Rules 702 and 703 adopted in Jones and
Daubert.'43
132. Id. at 487, 392 S.E.2d at 782.
133. Id. at 486, 392 S.E.2d at 782.
134. Id. at 487, 392 S.E.2d at 782.
135. Id. at 488, 392 S.E.2d at 783.
136. Id. at 488-90, 392 S.E.2d at 783-84.
137. Id. at 488-89, 392 S.E.2d at 783.
138. Id. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784.
139. 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
140. Id. at 17, 515 S.E.2d at 516.
141. Id. at 18, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
142. Id. at 18-19, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
143. Id. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion under Rule 702 and Jones:
While this Court does not adopt Daubert, we find the proper
analysis for determining admissibility of scientific evidence
is now under the SCRE [South Carolina Rules of Evidence]
.... under Rule 702, SCRE, the trial judge must find the
evidence will assist the trier of fact, the expert witness is
qualified, and the underlying science is reliable. The trial
judge should apply the Jones factors to determine
reliability.'"
Applying the Jones factors laid out in Ford,14 the Supreme Court noted that the
evidence would help the jury, that mtDNA testing has been subject to peer
review, that the F.B.I. has determined the rate of error, and that the science has
been acceptedby the scientific community.' Since the testimony regarding the
mtDNA test met these criteria, the court deemed the testimony admissible. 47
C. The Post-Kurnho Impact on South Carolina and Council
Thus, South Carolina has addressed the same issue as the United States
Supreme Court addressedinKumho-whatis the best approach for formulating
a rule for admissibility of expert testimony that works for all situations. There
are two possible approaches to this task: (1) use a flexible test, which will
apply to all expert testimony but which may cause uncertainty and variations
in application, or (2) adopt a more rigid test that will achieve more certainty,
but which may result in arbitrary, mechanical decisions. Kumho followed the
approach of Daubert and Joiner and opted for the flexible approach to all
expert testimony. Though South Carolina has not yet dealt with many of the
issues addressed in Kumho, it appears that South Carolina is, at least, moving
toward a flexible approach.
Like the United States Supreme Court in Daubert and in Kumho, South
Carolina has adopted a factor-based test for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony. The Jones factors originally formulated in Ford ' ultimately
turn out to be very similar to the Daubert factors. Moreover, the approach using
the factors in Council shows a great similarity to the Daubert approach. The
court in Council found that mtDNA testing has been subject to peer review.
144. Id. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
145. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
146. Council, 335 S.C. at20, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
147. Id. at 21, 515 S.E.2d at 519.
148. The Jones factors consist of publications and peer review of the technique, prior
application ofthe method, the quality control procedures used, and the consistency of the method
with recognized scientific laws and procedure. See Ford, 273 S.C. at 487, 392 S.E.2d at 782.
149. Council, 335 S.C. at 21, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
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They also stated the "F.B.I. laboratory validated the process and determined its
rate of error,"' ' and that the "underlying science has been generally accepted
in the scientific community."'5 ' The Daubert analysis of admissibility contains
a similar focus on peer review, known or potential rate of error, the theory's
general acceptance, and whether the theory can be tested.52
It should be noted that, though South Carolina has adopted a multi-factor
scheme like that used in Daubert, State v. Council held that the Court would
not adopt Daubert.53 An advantage of this approach is that South Carolina can
independently develop its own scheme for evaluating expert witness testimony
without having to decipher vague cases like Daubert.
Though South Carolina has not finished formulating its approach for the
admissibility of expert testimony, ithas already approached many of the issues.
As to the issue of the standard of review for expert testimony, South Carolina
has held that the admissibility of an expert's testimony is within the discretion
of the trial judge. 5 Thus, the standard in South Carolina is the same as that
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Joiner.
Numerous South Carolina cases adopt a deference to the trial court's
discretion in allowing experts to testify. One such case was Small v. Pioneer
Machinery, Inc.,155 in which Small was injured in a logging accident when a
tree limb fell on him. 5' At the time, Small was trying to remove his saw from
the tree in which it was stuck. 57 His coworker placed the blade of his skidder
against the tree in an effort to help Small release the blade. 8 Once the blade
was released, Small heard the motor start which caused the tree to fall. 59 Small
alleged that the log skinner was defectively designed causing its throttle to stick
and, ultimately, to push the tree over.60 Small's expert witness, basing his
testimony on Small's and the coworker's testimony, as well as his review of the
design documents, hypothesized that the design of the skidder was defective. 6'
Over defendant's objections that the expert did not have the proper factual
foundation, the trial court allowed the expert's testimony.'62 The court of
appeals agreed and stated: "The qualification of an expert witness and the
admissibility of an expert's testimony are matters within the trial court's
150. Id. at 21, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
151. Id. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at5l8.
152. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. For Daubert analysis see supra Part II.B.1.
153. Council, 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
154. See McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 321 S.C. 340, 347,468 S.E.2d 633, 638 (1996);
Creed v. City of Columbia, 310 S.C. 342,344-45,426 S.E.2d 785,786 (1993); Hill v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 204 S.C. 83, 106, 28 S.E.2d 545, 553 (1943).
155. 329 S.C. 448,494 S.E.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1997).
156. Id. at 455, 494 S.E.2d at 838.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 469, 494 S.E.2d at 846.
162. Id. at 468, 494 S.E.2d at 845.
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discretion .... the trier of fact determines it probative value., 163 Thus, the
appellate court deferred to the trial court and found no abuse of discretion.
A similar approach was adopted in State v. Register, H,'" in which the
expert testified regarding an analysis of DNA found on the victim performed
by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED).'65 The examination
consisted of a five-probe analysis of the DNA which revealed a strong match
between Register's DNA and the DNA found on the victim. 166 An expert
testified that such a strong match was rare. 67 Register objected to the
admissibility of the expert testimony, alleging that the method used by SLED
to determine probability was unreliable and, therefore, should not be
admitted. 68 The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's admission of the expert
testimony, stating:
[T]he judge concluded that the techniques used by SLED in
developing the database and in determining the probability of
finding Register's particular DNA pattern were based on
generally accepted scientific principles. Accordingly, the
judge admitted the evidence after determining that the jury,
after hearing testimony by the experts, could make its own
decision as to the reliability of the statistics. We find no error
in its admission 
6
IV. CONCLUSION
Kumho appears to have ended the debate on the flexibility and application
of Daubert to the admissibility of expert testimony. The potential problems
Kumho creates for determining whether an expert should testify, such as the
lack of uniformity and predictability, may not be problems at all since the
admissibility of expert testimony has long been within the trial judge's
discretion. Kumho may simply reinforce the district courts' power and
flexibility to determine factors of admissibility. South Carolina, never having
adopted Daubert, will likely remain unaffected.
Both Daubert and Kumho addressed the problem of providing a test for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony that is both applicable to all
cases and specific enough to provide a reasonable level of certainty and
equality. There are so many types of experts on so many different subjects that
it is nearly impossible devise a uniform test or an exhaustive list of factors.
163. Id. at 469-70, 494 S.E.2d at 846 (citation omitted).
164. 323 S.C. 471,476 S.E.2d at 153 (1995).
165. Id. at 474, 476 S.E.2d at 155.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 475, 476 S.E.2d at 156.
168. Id. at 481, 476 S.E.2d at 159.
169. Id. at 482, 476 S.E.2d at 159.
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Because the courts simply cannot give a definitive answer on a subject with so
many variables, a case-by-case analysis should logically prevail; however, it
may lead to uncertainties in expert testimony admissibility. Giving the trial
courts the "gatekeeper" role allows trial courts the discretion to decide whether
an expert's testimony is relevant and reliable, but also prevents any type of
uniform analysis among the courts and may cause uncertainty among
practitioners. At present, the balance tips in favor of the argument that the lack
of an objective standard will lead to more confusion rather than less.
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